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Tax Timing and the Haig-Simons Ideal:
A Rejoinder to Professor Popkin
JEF

STRNAD*

Professor Popkin makes two major sets of points in reply to my recent
article.' The first set of points involves the proper application of the HaigSimons ideal to issues of tax timing. Professor Popkin argues that the proper
interpretation of that ideal calls for increases in wealth to be taxed as they
occur rather than for a cash flow income tax ("CFIT") that taxes revenues
as they are received and allows costs to be deducted when they are paid.
He also constructs a "control and dominion theory" that he claims supports
his proposed tax over the CFIT.
Part I contains a reply to these claims. The conventional statement of the
Haig-Simons ideal requires that if wealth increases from $A to $B over an
accounting period, then taxes should reduce wealth by the tax rate multiplied
by $(A - B). Both the CFIT and Professor Popkin's proposed tax involve
the same total net tax over time. His proposed tax, however, moves this net
tax to an earlier point than the CFIT, and, as a result, does not tax wealth
changes in a Haig-Simons manner.
Professor Popkin's control and dominion theory is motivated by the fear
of abuse. Under a CFIT, the government will share in the costs of investment
through an immediate deduction, but the taxpayer may not act as a proper
fiduciary in protecting the government's investment. Part I concludes with
two points. First, the danger of abuse is minimal. Second, attempting to address the abuse does not imply the use of Professor Popkin's proposed tax.
Professor Popkin's second set of arguments consists of a normative evaluation of the methodology used to apply the Haig-Simons ideal. His main
argument is that the pre-tax situation in the tax world rather than the notax world situation is the proper benchmark to use in assessing after-tax
results. Part 11 shows that neither of these two benchmarks has a very strong
normative justification at present. In addition, if the pre-tax situation in the
tax world is used as a benchmark, the CFIT can be taken as the embodiment
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of the Haig-Simons ideal. The fact that this result was derived in a setting
that ignores the impact of taxes on pre-tax incomes is irrelevant. The pretax results are being taken as a starting point regardless of their origin. This
link between the CFIT and the Haig-Simons ideal is exactly the kind of
conclusion that Professor Popkin opposes.

I.

APPLYING THE HAIG-SIMONS IDEAL TO

TAX TIMONG ISSUES

One of the main results in my article was that the cash flow income tax
("CFIT") implements the Haig-Simons ideal in a non-general-equilibrium
setting, that is, where the effect of taxes on pre-tax prices is ignored.
Specifically, I demonstrated that for investment and borrowing transactions,
the CFIT reduces the present value of increases in net wealth by exactly the
tax rate. 2 This reduction is the same as would occur if the investment or
borrowing rights were sold and the gain from sale taxed at the applicable
3
tax rate.
Professor Popkin makes two major criticisms of my analysis. First, he
finds that my interpretation of the Haig-Simons ideal "contains a bias in
4
favor of the (CFIT)" and that I "mischaracterize" the Haig-Simons ideal.
Second, he proposes that a "more plausible" and "fairer" formulation of
the Haig-Simons ideal is that the taxpayer actually pay the tax to the government on wealth increments, rather than retain wealth subject to a future tax
obligation with a present value equal to the payment.' The last part of this
conception refers to the fact that although the CFIT reduces the present value
of wealth increases by the proper amount, the government does not actually
collect the corresponding taxes until later. Professor Popkin finds his approach
fairer because he prefers a theory of "control and dominion" over the
"accrual" theory that I used to argue that the CFIT implements the HaigSimons ideal in a non-general-equilibrium setting.
Section A of this part shows that the CFIT implements the Haig-Simons
ideal as conventionally stated while Professor Popkin's proposed "ideal

2. See id. at 1068-69, 1077-78, 1085, 1091-92, 1099. This result depends on a group of
simplifying assumptions about tax rate structure and the tax treatment of losses. Tax rates are
taken to be constant over time and to be independent of the amount of income (i.e., no
progressivity or regressivity), full loss offsets are assumed to be available, and there is no
special rate on capital gains. Unless otherwise noted, these assumptions are used in this rejoinder
also. For a discussion of these assumptions and their appropriateness to the points that I wish
to make, see id. at 1042-43.
3. See Strnad, The Bankruptcy of Conventional Tax Timing isDeeper Than Semantics:
A Rejoinder to Professors Kaplow and Warren, California Institute of Technology Social
Science Working Paper No. 599 (March 1986), at 10-11, 17, 40-41, 43-44, 46 (to be published
in January 1987 STAN. L. REv.).
4. Popkin, Tax Ideals in the Real World: A Comment on Professor Strnad's Approach
to Tax Fairness, 62 IND. L.J. 63, 63 (1986).
5. See id.at 64.
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income tax" does not. Section B argues that Professor Popkin's control and
dominion theory does not justify the choice of his proposed tax over the
CFIT.
A.

The Haig-Simons Ideal

The conventional definition of the Haig-Simons ideal can be taken directly
from the widely quoted formulation by Henry Simons: "Personal income
may be defined as the algebraic sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised
in consumption and (2) the change in the value of the store of property
rights between the beginning and the end of the period in question." ' 6 This
formulation requires that two quantities be defined in order to implement
it: (1) the "benchmark" change in the value of property rights between the two
times that begin and end an accounting period, and (2) a measure of the
after-tax result to compare against the benchmark.
There are at least two choices to make in selecting a benchmark. First,
one needs to choose between pre-tax results in a world with taxes and the
results in a hypothetical "no-tax world." Second, value can be measured
by market value (the value at which an investment or borrowing rights trade)
or by present value (the value of the future flows discounted to current
dollars). Similarly, in assessing after-tax results, one can use after-tax present
value or the actual after-tax yield if the investment or borrowing right were
sold. None of these choices matters when one is comparing the CFIT against
the Haig-Simons ideal. 7 The CFIT implements that ideal in-a non-generalequilibrium setting independent of which of the above-mentioned baselines
or measures of after-tax result one chooses.
Professor Popkin does not dispute these results. Instead, he argues that
this approach somehow "mischaracterizes" the Haig-Simons ideal. As stated,
however, that ideal calls for measuring "baseline" changes in wealth between
the beginning and end of an accounting period and then comparing the
after-tax result to that baseline to see if the baseline change has been reduced
by the appropriate tax rate.
Professor Popkin does not ever state the Haig-Simons definition in his
reply. He argues that I "mischaracterize" the definition, that "the Strnad
version" of the definition is "defective on basic fairness grounds," and that
adopting this version "begs the question." 51 But the version stated above is

6. H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOmE TAxATION 50 (1938). Even those who disagree with my
result that the CFIT implements the Haig-Simons ideal accept this definition (or one close to
it) as the statement of the ideal. See, e.g., Kaplow & Warren, An Income Tax by Any Other
Name - A Reply to Professor Strnad, 38 STAN. L. REv. 399, 399, 408 n.39 (1985).
7. See Strnad, supra note 3, at 7-17, 40-41, 43-44, 46.
8. See Popkin, supra note 4, at 64. Professor Popkin also cites a reply by Professors Louis
Kaplow and Alvin Warren to my original article. See Kaplow & Warren, supra note 6, at 407-12,
for his position that I "mischaracterize" the Haig-Simons ideal. In my rejoinder to Professors
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not some special "Strnad version" of the ideal; it is the formulation that
Henry Simons uses and that scholars have continually cited. 9 There is more
than merely an issue of semantics here. The Haig-Simons ideal is an important normative ideal: changes in wealth between any two points in time
should be reduced by the appropriate tax rate. The results that follow from
the ideal may be "defective on basic fairness grounds," but that implies
that the ideal is being rejected or supplemented by some other norms.
Section B discusses these other norms. The present section addresses a
prior question. Professor Popkin states that a "fairer interpretation of the HaigSimons ideal" would require the tax that he proposes as an alternative to
the CFIT.' ° How does Professor Popkin's proposed tax compare to the HaigSimons ideal as conventionally stated? The example that follows shows that
his proposed tax fails to meet that ideal.
Professor Popkin's tax requires that the taxpayer actually pay the tax to
the government on wealth increments, rather than retain wealth subject to
a future tax obligation with a present value equal to the payment." I will
call this tax a "Samuelsonian income tax" or "SIT" for short.' 2 It requires
that all changes in wealth by taxed precisely when they occur.
Suppose that the pre-tax interest rate is constant for riskless transactions
during a year and compounds to an annual rate of 10% per year. 3 Suppose
an investor borrows $X at time 0 to buy an investment. The only return on

Kaplow and Warren, I show that their arguments suffer from one or both of two fatal flaws.
See Strand, supra note 3, at 18-22. First, they compare my results for a portion of an accounting
period to the change in wealth over an entire accounting period. This is an error. They should
have examined my results for the whole accounting period. These results are consistent with
the change in wealth over that period. Second, they may reject the idea that the baseline change
in wealth from the beginning to the end of a period should be measured by market value or
present value. But they present no alternative measure, and it is doubtful that one could be
constructed that is consistent with modern economic notions of value.
9. See supra note 6. Haig and Simons themselves did not believe that the CFIT implemented
their ideal. This does not mean that they believed in some ideal other than the one they stated
or that their ideal should be interpreted somehow to exclude the CFIT. Those who define a norm
do not thereby become the exclusive expositors of the norm for all time. The Haig-Simons ideal
as conventionally stated is an important norm that has served as a guidepost for policymakers
over several decades. See Strnad, supranote 1, at 1025. But I believe that Haig and Simons failed
to see clearly the true implications of their ideal. See Strnad, supra note 3, at 6-7, 22.
10. See Popkin, supra note 4, at 64. He also says that this tax conforms to "the income tax
ideal." Id. at 65. Is this a separate norm from the Haig-Simons ideal? It appears to be.
11. Id. at 64-65.
12. The motivation for this name is that in a famous article, Paul Samuelson showed that
this is the only tax that produces valuations that do not depend on the taxpayer's marginal
tax rate. See Samuelson, Tax Deductibility of Economic Depreciation to Insure Invariant
Valuations, 72 J. PoLrr. EcoN. 604 (1964). Thus, all taxpayers would be willing to pay at most
the same amount (say $A) for a given investment. Since this amount is independent of the
taxpayer's bracket, it is the market value of the investment.
13. The results would not change if the riskless interest rate were allowed to vary over the
period.
A constant interest rate that compounds continuously to 10% over the period is generated
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the investment is at time 1 (exactly a year later). This return is $1100 plus
1.1 x $X, and it will be received for certain.' 4 The loan is due at time I so
that the investor discharges it by paying 1.1 x $X at that time. In cash flow
terms, the investor has obtained $1100 at time 1 without paying anything
at time 0. Clearly, in this series of transactions, "the investment" is profitable.
Suppose the investor was not taxed on the investment. Then, at time 0,
the investor's wealth increases by $1000. This is because a tax-exempt investor
would pay $1000 at time 0 to gain $1100 for certain at time 1 when the
market interest rate for riskless transactions is 10%. For this tax-exempt
investor, the "present value" at time 0 of receiving $1100 at time 1 is $1000.
Suppose that everyone is taxed using a Samuelsonian income tax. Then,
as Professor Samuelson has shown, each person would assign the same value
to the investment as the tax-exempt investor. 5 As a result, the market value
of this investment would be the same as the present value to the tax-exempt
investor, and each investor would perceive the investment as having a present
6
value equal to that market value.'
Now consider an investor who is subject to a marginal tax rate of 40%.
This investor pays taxes continuously as the investment increases in value.
The following table divides the year into ten equal periods and presents the
market value, the change in market value and several measures of taxes and
tax rates. These tax and tax rate measures will be explained subsequently.
The figures given for time 0 are those associated with the instantaneous
increase in wealth of $1000 that occurs at that time. Thus, the "period"
associated with time 0 is not one-tenth of a year long but extends from an

by solving for r in the equation e' = 1 + .10. Then the interest rate over a period of length
t is r(t) where r(t) = e" - I.
14. Analyzing a risky investment would be more complicated and would not add to my
conclusions about the SIT. For the CFIT, adding risk to the analysis does not change the result
that the CFIT implements the Haig-Simons ideal in a non-general-equilibrium setting. See
Strnad, supra note 1, at 1050-52, 1065-67, 1068-69, 1084-85, 1089-92.
15. This is Samuelson's main result: in order for valuations to be invariant (to marginal
tax rate), changes in wealth must be taxed at the time they occur. See supra note 12.
16. The reason that the result is true is that the SIT reduces the after-tax discount rate
from the level of the pre-tax interest rate more for high-bracket taxpayers than for low-bracket
taxpayers. The additional reduction in that discount rate for high-bracket taxpayers is just
enough to cancel out the greater reduction in future revenues that those taxpayers face.
An investor with a marginal tax rate of T would experience an annualized after-tax discount
rate of et")-I where r is defined as in supra note 13. See Samuelson, supra note 12, at 604.
For example, where the annualized pre-tax interest rate is 10% and the investor is in the 40%
tax bracket, the annualized after-tax interest rate would be 5.89%. Since the investor can earn
5.89% after-tax on a riskless market investment, 5.89% is the after-tax discount rate used to
evaluate other investments.
Note that this is less than 60% of 10%. This is because the SIT taxes wealth changes as
they occur. Suppose the investor in the 40% bracket invests $100 for one year at 10%, the
market rate of return. What is the after-tax return at the end of the year that would be
equivalent to the SIT? It is $105.89. An end of the year after-tax return of $106 would be too
much because that return is equivalent to delaying the $4 tax on the $10 return until the end
of the year. That $10 gain accumulates (in unrealized form) gradually during the year.
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infinitesimally small time before time 0 to an infinitesimally small time after
that time.
TABLE I

Time
(years)

Present
Value
(equals
market
value)

Change in
Present
Value Since
Last Period

Tax Paid
Since Last
Period

Cumulative
Tax

Cumulative
Tax
Rate

0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
1.0

1000.00
1009.58
1019.25
1029.01
1038.86
1048.01
1058.85
1068.99
1079.23
1089.57
1100.00

1000.00
9.58
9.67
9.76
9.85
9.95
10.04
10.14
10.23
10.34
10.43

400.000
3.832
3.868
3.904
3.940
3,980
4.016
4.056
4.092
4.136
4.172

400.00
406.14
412.34
418.62
424.98
431.41
437.91
444.49
451.14
457.88
464.69

0.4000
0.4023
0.4046
0.4068
0.4091
0.4113
0.4136
0.4158
0.4180
0.4202
0.4224

At time 0, the investor's wealth increases instantaneously by $1000. The
SIT taxes away $400 of this increase immediately. Then between time 0 and
time .1 the market value of the investment increases by $9.58. '7 During that
period, $3.832, 40% of the $9.58, must be paid to the government, This is
indicated in the fourth column. The fifth column, "cumulative tax," indicates the amount that the investor would have to pay at a given time for
that amount to be financially equivalent to all previous SIT payments. Thus,
paying $406.14 at time .1 is financially equivalent to paying $400 at time 0
and paying $3.832 between time 0 and time .1 in the way specified by the
SIT. "Financially equivalent" means that the taxpayer pays interest at market
rates to the government to compensate for the delay in payment of the taxes.
After the tax impact of the SIT, this will amount to paying at an after-tax
annual rate of 5.89% for a taxpayer in the 40% bracket.'
The final column, "cumulative tax rate," is the rate obtained by dividing
the total pre-tax change to date in the investor's wealth, listed in column 2,
by the cumulative tax to date, listed in column 5. This portrays the aftertax change in wealth position of the investor. The early payment of taxes
means that the investor's borrowing must be increased or investment must

17. This is computed by the formula $1000 x e" .- where r is as defined in supra note 13.
Under the assumption of a constant, continuously compounding interest rate, $1 at time 0 will
grow to $1 x e- pre-tax at time t.
18. See supra note 16 (explaining the 5.8907o rate). The $400 tax due at time 0 is increased
by the amount of interest over a tenth of a period that corresponds to a continuously compounded
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be decreased. Presumably, this borrowing or investment is at market rates of
return. The after-tax annualized rate of return on market investments and the
after-tax annualized cost of borrowing for an investor in the 40% bracket is
5.8907o."' When this investor pays $X in taxes T months early, the after-tax
reduction in wealth is the after-tax interest that the investor would earn on
$X for T months. The final two columns of Table 1 build this reduction into
the tax and tax rate computations.
When an investor in the 40% tax bracket experiences a pre-tax wealth
increase of $1100 over a year, the Haig-Simons ideal requires that $440,
40% of the $1100, be taken in taxes from the investor. But the SIT effectively
taxes away $464.69 of the $1100 gain instead of $440. The SIT therefore
does not meet the Haig-Simons ideal as conventionally stated.
Under the CFIT for an investor in the 40% tax bracket, the government
would tax 40% of the $1100 at time 1. At the end of the year, the investor
will have an increase in wealth after-tax that isonly 600o as large as the
pre-tax increase, as required by the Haig-Simons ideal. At any given earlier
time, the after-tax present value of the gains will be reduced by 40%. Thus,
the tax will "accrue" at the proper rate against wealth changes under the
Haig-Simons ideal. The following table illustrates this phenomenon for the
CFIT and a 40% bracket taxpayer.
TABLE

2

Time
(years)

Market
Value

After tax
Present
Value

Cumulative
Tax

Cumulative
Tax
rate

0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
1.0

1000.00
1009.58
1019.25
1029.01
1038.86
1048.81
1058.85
1068.99
1079.23
1089.57
1100.00

600.00
605.75
611.55
617.40
623.32
629.29
635.31
641.40
647.54
653.74
660.00

400.00
403.83
407.70
411.60
415.54
419.52
423.54
427.60
431.69
435.83
440.00

.4000
.4000
.4000
.4000
.4000
.4000
.4000
.4000
.4000
.4000
.4000

annual rate of 5.89%. Algebraically, this amount of interest is $400 x (e, .6 .1-1).
The cumulation of the $3.832 tax is more complicated. This is the total amount of tax that
occurs from time 0 to time .1. Different amounts of interest must be charged on different pieces
of this tax because each piece of the tax occurs at a different time during the period. Pieces that
are closer to time .1 will result in lower interest charges than pieces of equal size that are closer
to time 0. It is possible to show, using calculus, that this $3.832 tax plus the after-tax interest
charges on it will amount to $1000 x (el I ' -e" A.1) at time .1.
19. See supra note 16.
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At time 0, the market value of the investment is $1000.20 But the fact
that a tax of $440 is due at time I reduces the after-tax present value at
time 0 to $600. This is easy to explain. Under a CFIT, the after-tax interest
rate is the same as the pre-tax interest rate. 2' The tax of $440 at time I has
a present value of $400 which equals $440/1.1 at time 0. 22 This reduces the
pre-tax present value of $1000 at time 0 to an after-tax present value of
$600. The "cumulative tax" at time 0 in column four is therefore $400. The
future tax liability reduces present wealth by the Haig-Simons amount, 40%.
Thus, the "cumulative tax rate" at time 0 in column five is 40%. The same
result would occur if the investor sold the investment at time 0. Gain would
be $1000 and the tax $400. This is a general trait of the CFIT in a nongeneral-equilibrium setting. The reduction in after-tax present value experienced if the investment is retained is exactly the same as the tax if it were
sold.

23

20. Under a CFIT, an investor will be willing to pay a certain amount SA before tax for
an investment. This amount is independent of the investor's marginal tax bracket. Thus, SA
is the market value of the investment.
To see this, consider an example. How would investors at time 0 value an investment return
of SX at time I? Let the value be V(T) for an investor with marginal tax rate T. (This "value"
is the most the investor would pay for the investment). Suppose the pre-tax riskless interest
rate is i. Under the CFIT, this is also the after-tax riskless interest rate for all taxpayers with
tax rates less than 100%. See Strnad, supra note 1, at 1053-56. For an investor subject to
marginal tax rate T, the after-tax cost of buying the investment for V(T) is T x V(T). V(T)
must be such that the after-tax return T x $X at time I is (I + i) multiplied by the after-tax
cost of T x V(T). If V(T) is any larger, then the investment would return less than i after-tax.
In that case, the investor would not buy it because the after-tax return i is available in the
marketplace. But T x V(T) = (I + i) x T x $X implies that V(T) = (I + i) x $X after
dividing T out from both sides. V(T) is independent of T since both i and SX are independent
of T. The pre-tax amount that an investor is willing to pay for the investment does not depend
on the tax rate.
Note that this quality is the same one that the SIT has: valuation is invariant to the tax
rate. This might seem to contradict Samuelson's result that the SIT is the unique tax that has
this property. Samuelson's result, however, is based on a broader definition of "valuation"
than merely the pre-tax amount that the taxpayer is willing to pay. Under the SIT, the aftertax present value of the investment for each taxpayer is equal to the "market value," the pretax amount that each taxpayer is willing to pay. So the after-tax present value is independent
of the taxpayer's marginal bracket. In contrast, under the CFIT after-tax present value varies
among taxpayers and is not equal to market value for any taxpayer facing a positive tax rate.
This difference does not affect the issues discussed in this rejoinder.
21. See Strnad, supra note 1, at 1053-56, 1068-69. The intuition behind this result is
straightforward. Consider an investment earning the pre-tax market rate of return. The CFIT
reduces all costs and revenues by the same proportion, the marginal tax rate. As a result, the
after-tax rate of return will be the same as the pre-tax rate of return.
22. The present value at time 0 of revenue $X at time I is simply the amount SY at time
0 that would grow to be $X by time 1 at the market rate of return. When this rate of return
is 10%, it follows that $Y x 1.1 = $X. Thus, SY = $X/(I.I).
23. See Strnad, supra note 3, at 10-11, 17, 40-41, 43-44, 46. Under a SIT, there will be no
tax if an investment is sold. The increase in market value is taxed continuously as it occurs.
At any given moment, adjusted basis is thus equal to market value, and no taxable income
would result on the sale.
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Table 2 indicates that the CFIT meets the Haig-Simons ideal as conventionally defined at all times during the year. 24 Table I indicates that the SIT
meets the ideal only in the case where the investment is sold at time 0
immediately after it is made. It can be shown that the total amount of tax
paid under the SIT and the CFIT are the same in the example: $440.21 But
the extra burden caused by forcing the investor to pay earlier under the SIT
causes deviations from the Haig-Simons ideal. This extra burden does not
exist if the investment is sold at time 0. In that case, the CFIT and the SIT
result in identical tax timing, a tax of $400 at time 0.26
B.

The Control and Dominion Theory

Section A shows that Professor Popkin's proposed tax, the SIT, does not
meet the Haig-Simons ideal as conventionally stated. Thus, his additional
arguments for the SIT based on a "control and dominion perspective," are
tax fairness arguments that supplement rather than define the Haig-Simons
ideal. These arguments would have us impose a tax that does not reduce
wealth gains over the accounting period by the tax rate.
Professor Popkin develops his argument by analogy to the issue of how
debt should be treated under an ideal income tax. Normally, the principal
amount borrowed is not taken into income because there is thought to be
an equal and offsetting reduction in wealth due to the obligation to repay.
This is "accrual accounting." The repayment accrues on the tax accounts
at the time that the money is borrowed, thereby cancelling the borrower's
income from receipt of the principal.
Professor Popkin notes that this accrual accounting treatment of debt is
not always desirable. The taxpayer receives control and dominion of the
principal upon borrowing, but the amount or the fact of repayment may be
uncertain. This uncertainty makes it "questionable whether a taxpayer with

24. For example, consider the period between time 0 and time .6. Wealth before tax has
increased by $1058.85 during that period (including the initial jump of $1000 at time 0). But
the after-tax present value of this wealth increase is only $635.31. That is 60% of the pre-tax
figure as required by the Haig-Simons ideal for a 40% bracket taxpayer. The same result would
be obtained if the investment were sold at time .6: the investor would retain $635.31 after-tax.
25. This can be seen from the example by adding the taxes under the SIT in column 4 of
Table 1. See supra text accompanying notes 16-17. The result is $439.996. That differs from
$440 only because of cumulative error due to rounding.
26. It is tempting to argue that the SIT would meet the Haig-Simons ideal if we "adjusted"
the tax rate schedule to take into account continuous taxation of gains. But this adjustment is
not possible. The effective tax rate under the SIT depends on which transaction is being taxed.

There is no adjustment in tax tables that would achieve the proper result for all transactions.
This can be seen from the example. The cumulative tax rate in column 6 in Table 1, see
supra text accompanying notes 16-17, varies over the life of the investment. For example, the
SIT produces a different tax rate if the investment is sold at time .5 than if it is retained until
time 1. These are two different transactions and are subject to different tax rates.
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cash subject to a debt should enjoy tax-free use of current funds while
others must spend out of after tax cash .... -27 As a result, the cash method
of accounting inherent in the CFIT is applied. The amount borrowed is
taken into income at the time it is borrowed, and there is no deduction for
repayment or interest payments until they actually occur.
What does concern about uncertainty imply about the proper treatment
of investments? The answer to this question depends on why the uncertainty
of future costs and revenues is worrisome. One idea is that taxpayers should
neither benefit nor suffer currently from the tax consequences of future
events that may never occur. 28 This idea argues for across-the-board CFIT
treatment. A person should not receive a deduction until payment is actually

made and should not be taxed on revenues until they are actually received.
Professor Popkin advocates a very different method for the taxation of
investment revenues. He argues that doubts about whether a tax will actually
be paid suggest that it is not sufficient that a future tax will lower after-tax

present value. The future taxes must actually be accrued on the tax accounts
and paid presently. They cannot be allowed to simply "accrue" as reductions
in present value. 29 In essence, Professor Popkin is arguing that the taxpayer
should be put on the accrual method of accounting for future revenue receipts
as opposed to the cash method inherent in the CFIT. a0
Protecting the fisc is the goal that motivates this position.', Deductions
should not be taken for costs until they are paid since the costs may never
occur. Otherwise, the taxpayer may exploit the tax system by taking out
current revenues tax free by sheltering them under the guise of future obligations that may never arise.32 By analogy, Professor Popkin claims that

27. Popkin, supra note 4, at 66.
28. This idea can be stated using "control and dominion" rhetoric. "Control and dominion"
over uncertain revenues does not occur until actual receipt of the revenues.
29. See Popkin, supra note 4, at 66.
30. Professor Popkin refers to the "accrual" of present value reductions as "the 'accrual'
method of reporting income." Id. This is confusing. The accrual method of accounting for taxation requires that revenues or costs in a later accounting period be taxed or deducted in the current
accounting period (perhaps after having been reduced to present value) if they are earned or
incurred in that period. For example, under the accrual method if all the events (such as
performance of services) required to earn the right to a payment occur in year 1, the earnings
will be taxed in that year even if not actually received until a later year. See M. GRAETz,
FEDERAL INCOME TAxATION: PRINC.PLES AND Poucas 820-21 (1985).
The SIT, Professor Popkin's proposed alternative, is an example of the accrual method of
accounting in its purest form. Profits that are earned during a period are taxed during that
period even if they are unrealized and are generated by revenues to be received in a later
period. In contrast, the cash method of accounting delays taxation until receipt of the revenues.
This causes the "accrual" of reductions in present value as opposed to the actual payment of
taxes under an accrual method of accounting.
31. Thus, Professor Popkin justifies his perspective by noting that the whole purpose of
taxes is to raise money for government expenditures. Fairness concepts should therefore center
on whether taxpayers have paid their dues and should be sensitive to the possibility that they
will exploit tax rules so as to escape taxation. See Popkin, supra note 4, at 67.
32. Professor Popkin notes some of the situations where current deductions for future costs

19861

TAX TIMING

the taxpayer should not be allowed to deduct current costs without also
currently paying for taxes on future revenues.
Under the CFIT, if a person invests $100 at time 0 in order to obtain
$110 at time 1, the person must pay tax on the $110 return before consuming
any of it. Professor Popkin, however, argues that before the $110 is realized,
the taxpayer has "control and dominion" over the wealth. He fears that
the taxpayer may "deplete it ... [or] use it ... to increase his income...
3a
with no fiduciary obligation to the government.1
There are two fatal flaws in this argument. First, for true investments,
the potential for abuse is minimal. Second, if one believes that taxpayers
should pay taxes up front to block abuse or because it is "fair" for them
to do so, Professor Popkin's proposed tax, the SIT, is not the only one
that will accomplish that purpose. In fact, there are taxes that will force
taxpayers to pay the accrued value of taxes up front and will also meet the
Haig-Simons ideal as conventionally defined. Thus, Professor Popkin's concerns do not argue specifically for the tax that he proposes. More normative
justification must be provided for choosing the SIT.
Consider first the possibility of abuse. Suppose the investment involves a
cost of $100 at time 0, and revenue of $110 is anticipated at time 1. A
taxpayer in the 40% bracket will get a deduction worth $40 after tax at time
0 and will pay $44 in taxes at time 1. The government in effect buys 40%
of the investment at the investor's cost of $100 and gets 40% of the returns.
The investor holds 60% of the investment.
Where is the possibility for abuse? The investor who "depletes" the
investment by not diligently earning the full $110 at the end suffers a direct
loss on his or her 60%. Any costs associated with the investment will be
deductible and the investor will bear only 60% of them after tax. If unexpected costs arise, the investor acting self-interestedly will act in the government's interest. The investor will compare 60% of the costs against 60%
of the returns and will take the same action that a 40% owner (the government) or a 100% owner would advocate.M

can lead to abuse. See Popkin, supra note 4, at 65-66. He also notes that one of the traditional
problems has been that future deductions have been allowed to accrue at face value, that is,
without discounting to present value. If after-tax interest rates are large, the taxpayer may even
make a profit by incurring future costs. See M. GRxA=z, supra note 30, at 844 (discussing
"structured settlements"). This problem is addressed explicitly by the Tax Reform Act of 1984.
Id. at 845-55.

33. Popkin, supra note 4, at 67.
34. There is a danger of abuse if some of the $110 is realized as consumption that escapes
taxation. In that case, the government provides 40%o of the cost but does not receive 40% of
the returns.
An example of this type of situation is the "hobby loss" problem. A taxpayer invests $100
in a show dog, but the main benefit is in enjoying the companionship of the dog. This consumption benefit is imputed investment income that is not taxed. Suppose that the companionship
of the dog is worth $60 to the owner and that diligently showing the dog is expected to return
$50. The government gets its 40% of the $50 but not of the $60. Current law addresses this by
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What about the danger that the investor will "use" an increase in wealth
to earn income before the government takes its share of the increase by
taxation? If the owner invests the $40 received from the $100 deduction,
under the CFIT the government will also obtain its 40% share of that
investment. If the investor borrows against the time 1 return of $66 aftertax, the CFIT will tax the proceeds of the loan at a 40% rate when the loan
is made to the investor. If those proceeds are then invested, cancelling out
the tax on them, the government will share in 40% of the returns from the
investment. As long as the CFIT applies across the board, the investor
cannot use unrealized wealth increases to augment income without the government taking its tax share.
Now consider the second problem with Professor Popkin's argument.
Suppose we want investors to pay taxes on expected future revenues up front
because we believe this is fair or prevents abuse. Professor Popkin's proposed
tax, the SIT, is one way to do this. But there are alternative ways that,
unlike the SIT, do not violate the Haig-Simons ideal.
Perhaps the simplest alternative approach of this sort is to collect at the
time of investment an amount equal to the present value of what future
expected taxes would be under a CFIT. Consider the example in section A
where the pre-tax interest rate is 10%, and an investment financed by
borrowing earns a pure profit of $1100 at time 1. Under a CFIT, a 40%
bracket taxpayer would pay $440 at time 1 in tax on this investment. The
present value of this tax payment at time 0 is $400. The alternative approach
would be to collect that $400 at time 0 and not to tax the revenues at time
1. Under this approach, the after-tax interest rate is still 10%.1 The impact
of the $400 tax at time 0 thus amounts to $440 at time 1. The extra $40 is
the after-tax cost of borrowing the $400 at time 0 or the after-tax cost of
foregoing that amount of investment at that time. The effective tax burden

identifying this type of situation and denying or limiting deductions for investment and operating
costs. See I.R.C. § 183 (1982); M. GRAETZ, supra note 30, at 377-83.
The danger of this sort of abuse, however, does not argue against the CFIT and in favor
of its competitors. The abuse can arise whenever consumption is supposed to be in the tax
base. The SIT and traditional forms of the income tax are taxes of that type. In fact, the
sections addressing the problem in the current tax law evolved in a traditional income tax
setting.
35. The after-tax riskless interest rate is obtained by calculating the after-tax rate of return
on a riskless investment that earns the market rate of return. Suppose the pre-tax market
riskIess rate is 10%. Consider a riskless investment of $100 at this market rate. It will earn
$110 at time 1. Under the CFIT, this would result in $110 of taxable income at time I and a
deduction of $100 at time 0.
Under the method of taxation presented in the text, the $100 deduction at time 0 remains,
but instead of taxing $110 at time 1, $100, the time 0 present value of the $110, is taxed at
time 0. The $100 in taxable income and the $100 deduction at time 0 cancel out. The investor
would earn the 10% return on the $100 without any tax consequences. Thus, the after-tax
interest rate would be 10%, the same as the pre-tax interest rate.
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would have exactly the same pattern as under a CFIT. 36 Therefore this tax
would meet the Haig-Simons ideal as conventionally stated in the same way
that the CFIT does. 37 At the same time, taxes
are collected "up front" so
38
that Professor Popkin's concerns are met.

There are normative reasons for choosing the SIT. For example, that tax
is neutral at the time of investment in the face of changing tax rates while
the CFIT is not. 39 This reason may justify choosing the SIT over the CFIT
despite the fact that the SIT does not have the tax base properties that the
CFIT has. '" The Haig-Simons ideal as conventionally stated, however, does

36. This tax burden is described in column 4 ("cumulative tax") of Table 2. See supra text
accompanying notes 20-23.
37. See supra text accompanying notes 19-24. This tax would allow investors to earn the
full amount of market interest on their investments. See supra note 35. This creates a change
in wealth that is not reduced in a Haig-Simons manner. In order to block this possibility, the
government would have to supplement the tax with "forced loans." Consider the example
from note 35. The taxpayer invests $100 at the market rate of interest of 10%. There are no
tax consequences. If the taxpayer is in the 40% bracket, the government would force the
taxpayer to borrow $40 from the government. The government would collect this sum plus
interest at the market rate at time 1. At time 1, the taxpayer would pay $44 to the government.
The taxpayer would end up with an after-tax gain of $6 instead of $10 at time 1. In effect,
interest earned at market rates on investments would be treated in a CFIT manner. Pure profits,
though, like the $1100 realized at time 1 in the text example, would be taxed according to the
new system.
38. Future revenues may be uncertain, and information may accumulate that requires
updating previous estimates. The suggested tax may therefore have to be adjusted at intervals
during the investment. This presents obvious difficulties. The situation for the SIT, however,
is even bleaker. The SIT requires taxation of changes in value the moment they occur. Thus,
an SIT tax must be adjusted moment by moment to incorporate changes in value due to new
information. Even if the SIT were "cumulated" so that taxation would occur at discrete
intervals, the exact timing of the value changes would be information necessary to calculate
the tax. See supra text accompanying notes 17-18 and note 18 (calculation of "cumulative tax"
under the SIT requires knowledge of the timing of value changes to properly compute interest
charges or allowances on the taxes).
39. Neutrality implies that the tax does not change the desire of investors to undertake any
particular investment. In the example, it is easy to see that both the SIT and the CFIT are
neutral. The investment is profitable before taxes as indicated by the pre-tax jump in present
value by $1000 at time 0. At time 0, both the CFIT and the SIT tax this amount at the statutory
rate. Thus, assuming this rate is less than 100%, profitable investments before tax will be
profitable after tax. Similarly, unprofitable investments before tax will be unprofitable after
tax. Investment incentives will not be affected by the tax.
The SIT retains this property when tax rates change during the life of the investment, while
the CFIT does not. See Sandmo, A Note on the Neutrality of the Cash Flow CorporationTax,
4 EcoN. L-rraas 173 (1979). Tax rates may change over the life of an investment for many
reasons. These include shifts in the investor's bracket under a progressive schedule as well as
legislative alteration of the statutory schedule.
40. Professor Popkin characterizes me as a "consumption tax advocate" based on my
results about the CFIT. See Popkin, supra note 4, at 65. This is odd. In my original article,
I explicitly disavow any intention of discussing the general issue of choosing between consumption taxes and income taxes. See Strnad, supra note 1, at 1106 n.185.
That article presents arguments for both of these tax systems. Consider the following nongeneral-equilibrium result in the article: The CFIT implements the Haig-Simons ideal but is
not equivalent to a yield exemption. The Haig-Simons property of the CFIT suggests choosing
it over the traditional income tax. On the other hand, the showing that the CFIT and yield
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not support the SIT, and neither does a theory based on control and dominion
4
ideas. Both of these point instead to choosing the CFIT over the SIT. '

II.

TAX BASE THEORY ISSUES

Professor Popkin raises two sets of issues in the portion of his reply that
is devoted to broader normative concerns. First, he suggests that the focus
in tax policy should be on "the distribution of losses" rather than on
maximizing some measure of social utility. I call this "the normative structure
issue." Second, he argues that if tax base theory is used, the benchmark
world should be the pre-tax situation of individuals in the world with taxes
rather than a hypothetical no-tax world. For simplicity, I will refer to the
pre-tax situation in the tax world as "the pre-tax world."
These issues go far beyond those addressed in my earlier work. Section
A shows how alternative resolutions of the issues affect the points made in
that work and in part I of this rejoinder. Choosing a "distribution of losses
approach" does not have much effect on any of these points, but taking
the pre-tax world as a benchmark affects several of the points. Selecting
that world as a benchmark makes the non-general-equilibrium results in the
earlier work much more significant. At the same time, using a pre-tax world
benchmark eliminates the need for potentially complex general equilibrium
computations.
Sections B through D discuss the substance of the normative structure and
choice of benchmark issues. The general conclusion is that the issues are

exemption are not equivalent, destroys one of the arguments for the easy administrability of
a consumption tax system. See id.
Not only do the non-general-equilibrium results cut both ways, but the article also qualifies
those results. The article explicitly states that the non-general-equilibrium link between the CFIT
and the Haig-Simons ideal is suspect because general equilibrium effects are likely to be
important. See id. at 1024-25, 1102-04.
Finally, my original article and its progeny do not discuss the desirability of the HaigSimons ideal itself but take it as an accepted norm in order to show that the conventional
wisdom based on it is incorrect. See Strnad, supra note 3, at 3 n.l. This approach is reasonable
given that many tax scholars begin with the Haig-Simons ideal as a starting point. See Strnad,
supra note 1, at 1025. But the Haig-Simons ideal and other simple tax base norms are problematic, and it is not clear that any of them should be the norm of choice to evaluate tax
systems. See R. TRESCH, PuBuc FINANcE: A NORMATVE APPROACH 267-74 (1981).
41. I will not attempt to discuss the choice between the SIT and the CFIT or between
proxies for those taxes. The results here are obtained in a simple non-general-equilibrium
setting. This makes them dubious guideposts in actual policy choices given that general equilibrium effects may be important. See Strnad, supra note 1, at 1024-25, 1102-04. Furthermore,
implementation issues are ignored here even though they are important in choosing between
tax systems. The SIT would be hard to implement in its pure form since it requires knowledge
of the exact time path of wealth changes. This path may be very complex. It includes, for
example, the fluctuations in the value of capital assets. These must be evaluated continuously
and not just "cumulated" as total changes over discrete accounting periods. Despite the apparent
simplicity of the CFIT, there are also significant problems that would arise in implementing

it. See Graetz, Expenditure Tax Design, in
161 (J. Pechman ed. 1980).

WHAT SHOULD BE TAXED: INCOME OR EXPENDITURE?

1986]

TAX TIMING

interesting but that Professor Popkin's positions need deeper theoretical
justifications than he offers.

A.

The Relation to Earlier Points

My original article makes two sets of points. One set centers on results
derived in that article for a non-general-equilibrium setting. In that setting,
the CFIT (and not what is traditionally thought to be an ideal income tax)
implements the Haig-Simons ideal. These results are independent of whether
one compares after-tax results to pre-tax world outcomes or to no-tax world
outcomes. 42 The implications that follow from the result, however, do depend
on the choice of benchmarks. Under either benchmark, the results lead one
to reject the claim that the SIT (or any other traditional income tax candidate)
implements the Haig-Simons ideal. If the pre-tax world is the proper benchmark, however, then the fact that the results were generated in a nongeneral-equilibrium setting is irrelevant. Thus, the results imply a "new
conventional wisdom" that the CFIT implements the Haig-Simons ideal. My
position has been that this final step linking the CFIT with the Haig-Simons
ideal is not justified.4 3 This position depends on a repudiation of the pretax world as a benchmark.
Unlike the choice of benchmark issue, the outcome of the normative
structure issue affects the significance of my non-general-equilibrium arguments only indirectly. The relevance of those arguments depends on whether
the Haig-Simons measure of income is normatively meaningful. It could be
chosen either as a measure of "the distribution of losses" or as a proxy
measure for individual utility in social utility calculations," and it may be
a more meaningful measure of one than the other.4 5 My non-general-equi-

42. These worlds are identical when the CFIT is the tax system in the tax world and general
equilibrium effects are ignored. See Strnad, supra note 1, at 1053-55, 1061-62. In fact, for a
CFIT and a non-general-equilibrium setting the following four benchmarks are identical: no-tax
world present value, no-tax world market value, tax world market value, and tax world present
value. See Strnad, supra note 3, at 7-12, 14-16, 40-41, 44-47.
In my original article, I specify two different ways that one might view the impact of taxes
on discount rates in a non-general-equilibrium setting. One of these corresponds to using the
pre-tax world as a benchmark. See Strnad, supra note 1, at 1053-56, 1061-62, 1079. Even in
this case, however, taxes that differ from the CFIT do not implement the Haig-Simons ideal.
See id. at 1075, 1078-80.
43. See Strnad, supra note 1, at 1024, 1037-38, 1102-04; Strnad, supra note 3, at 27-29.
44. Measuring individual utility in a social utility approach is especially relevant if the social
welfare function is "individualistic." That is, if it depends solely on the utilities of individuals.
There are certainly other approaches that are in a broad sense social utility approaches. The
essence of the °social utility approach is simply to specify some function that ranks social
alternatives. This function may depend partially or wholly on arguments other than the utilities
of the individuals in society. Nonetheless, the use of individualistic social welfare functions has
a large following among economic thinkers. See, e.g., A. ATKINSON & J. STIGLrrZ, LECTURES
ON PUBUC EcONoMics 339-41 (1980); R. TRESCH, supra note 40, at 21-22.
45. Note, however, that "losses" may be measured by utility changes. If so, the choice of
approaches has no effect on the relevance of the Haig-Simons ideal. The issue under both
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librium results will be more important under the normative structure in
which the Haig-Simons measure is more meaningful. 46
A second set of points in my original article concerns methodology. 47 I
argued for a two-step methodology. First, the total impact of various tax
systems should be assessed as carefully as possible under existing economic
technology. This implies that general equilibrium analysis should be used to
examine issues such as the choice between the CFIT and traditional income
tax variants. That is, the analysis should incorporate the impact of taxes on
pre-tax prices. Second, the alternative states resulting from various tax systems should be analyzed according to some norm. I did not discuss whether
this norm should be a social utility measure or a measure of the "distribution
of losses." Professor Popkin challenges these methodological claims only at
the first step. He suggests that the pre-tax world can be used as a benchmark.

This would obviate having to make general equilibrium calculations concerning the effect of taxes on pre-tax prices and incomes.

B.

Two Approaches to Tax Policy Analysis

Before discussing the substance of Professor Popkin's positions, it is useful
to contrast two approaches to tax policy analysis: classical tax base theory
and optimal tax theory. These are not i comprehensive set of alternatives,
nor are they mutually exclusive. 4 Examining them, however, clarifies my
reasons for discussing the Haig-Simons ideal in terms of a no-tax world
benchmark and sheds light on several of Professor Popkin's arguments.
Classical tax base theorists were faced with the following problem. It is
desirable that government raise taxes for certain expenditures. It is impract-

approaches is whether Haig-Simons income is a good proxy for utility. For a good discussion
of that issue, see R. TR.sc, supra note 40, at 265-74.
46. The goal in my original article was to explore the implications of the Haig-Simons ideal
itself rather than to consider whether the ideal is justifiable under deeper norms. That article
and associated work did discuss some of the weaknesses of the Haig-Simons ideal and cited
other such discussions. See Strnad, supra note 1, at 1093, 1094 & 1094 n.157; Stmad, supra
note 3, at 3 n.l. However, the overall approach was to take the Haig-Simons ideal as a given
on the basis of its widespread use as a starting point by tax policymakers. See supra note 40;
Strnad, supra note 1, at 1024-26; Strnad, supra note 3, at 3 n.I.
47. See Strnad, supra note 1, at 1102-07.
48. In an excellent recent article, Professors Walter Hettich and Stanley Winer discuss the
major theories used in tax policy analysis. See Hettich & Winer, Blueprints and Pathways: The
Shifting Foundationsof Tax Reform, 38 NAT'L TAX J. 423 (1985). They divide these into three
categories. The category that they call "optimal taxation" includes the optimal tax theory
discussed here. Classical tax base theory, falls into their category of "equitable taxation" theories.
Finally, they discuss a class of theories that they call "fiscal exchange" theories. These theories
explain taxation and tax reform from the perspective of political exchange in representative
government.
Some prominent legal scholars have applied normative theories to taxation that do not fall
into any of the mainstream categories established by Professors Hettich and Winer. See e.g.,
Kelman, Personal Deductions Revisited: Why They Fit Poorly in an 'Ideal' Income Tax and
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ical or unethical for government to tax people based on the benefits that
they receive from the expenditures. 9 As a result, there is a need to measure
the overall burden of the tax system in order to determine whether individuals
are making "fair" contributions. 50 Given this need, it makes sense to take
the no-tax world as a benchmark.
Professor Popkin believes that the focus should be on distributing tax
losses, and that this is an "important way of looking at our political relationships."'" The classical tax base approach implements this by looking at the
political bargain as a whole. We need to "fairly" exact burdens to pay for
the totality of government expenditures. Losses from the tax system should
be measured from the no-tax world if we want to know what people are "giving up" in order to enjoy the benefits of government. This gives us an idea
of whether the "social contract" implicit in having taxes and expenditures
is fair.
An "optimal taxation" approach works by specifying a social utility
function that compares the desirability of various states. Under this approach, the no-tax world has no special place. Two tax systems can be
compared directly under the social utility function. That function incorporates the social planner's views about distributional equity. 52 The no-tax (plus
no-expenditure) world would be of interest only in the unlikely event that
it is a strong candidate for maximizing social utility. 53 This view also is
relevant to our political relationships. There is no reason that a political
actor should give the no-tax world or any other world used to measure "tax
toward
losses" any particular moral credence. Why not strive as a society
54
a distributional ideal as embodied by a social utility function?

Why They Fit Worse in a Farfrom Ideal World, 31 STAN. L. REV. 831, 841-44, 880 (1979)
(tax policy positions taken with goal of avoiding "commoditization" of human life).
49. For a discussion of the various routes to classical tax base theory, see R. TRFSCH, supra
note 40, at 261-66; Hettich & Winer, supra note 47, at 424.
50. Classical tax base theory therefore is accompanied by the language of "fairness."
Professors Hettich and Winer classify that theory as a variety of "equitable taxation" theories.
See Hettich & Winer, supra note 48, at 424-26.
51. Popkin, supra note 4, at 72.
52. One of the problems with this approach is that social choice mechanisms that are felt
function. Conversely,
to be normatively desirable may not be capable of producing a social utility
those mechanisms that always can produce such a function have qualities that are undesirable,
if not totally unacceptable. For example, under weak rationality conditions with no restriction
on individual preferences, dictatorship is the only type of government that will guarantee the
existence of a social utility function describing "society's" ranking of social states. For a good
short discussion of these problems, see R. TRE sCH, supra note 40, at 25-26. For a more
comprehensive discussion, see D. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 184-201 (1979); A. SEN, COLLECTIVE
CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE 33-55 (1970).
53. Even advocates of the "minimal state" believe that there are some government functions
(such as providing a mechanism for enforcing private contracts) that are worthwhile. As they
are well aware, supporting these functions may require compulsory taxation. See A. ATKINSON
& J. STIGLrTZ, supra note 44, at 336-37.
54. There are concepts of economic or political equilibrium that may be taken to support
the approach of examining the distribution of losses. For example, there is the idea of "core"
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The Normative Structure and Benchmark Choices

Professor Popkin seems to be more comfortable with the classical tax base
theory approach because he is concerned that "tax losses should be distributed fairly." 5 But he adds a twist to that theory as stated above. He argues
that the baseline that defines losses should be the pre-tax world rather than
the no-tax world.56 His central justification for adding this twist is that taxes
influence individual preferences and talents in a way that affects pre-tax
income, and this should be taken into account.17 This justification, however,
does not imply the choice of the pre-tax world over the no-tax world as a
benchmark. Both of these benchmarks take into account effects on pre-tax
income, but they do so in different ways.
The following example illustrates this point. Suppose that imposing taxes
allocations. These have the property that no group can make itself better off by withdrawing
from the economy and setting up its own separate economy. See H. ScARF, Tn CoMPUTATION
oF EcoNOiMc EQUnIBRiA 206-07 (1973). The distribution of losses from the tax system would
be crucial from this type of perspective. Groups would compare those losses to the benefits to
them from government in order to determine whether to stay in the economy.
Some political or economic theory of this type is required to justify the distribution of
losses approach and to justify the choice of benchmarks under that approach. The ideas put
forward by Professor Popkin and my embellishments of them do not provide a solid basis for
choosing between the pre-tax world and the no-tax world as a benchmark on theoretical grounds.
See infra text accompanying notes 59-66. Only after the theory underlying the distribution of
losses approach is clarified will it be possible to come to some convincing conclusions about
the choice between benchmarks. I do not attempt that gargantuan task here. The core allocations
idea is only meant to be an example of the type'of theory that is necessary.
55. Popkin, supra note 4, at 72.
56. See id.at 71. The use of the pre-tax world as a benchmark would obviate the use of
general equilibrium analysis. Pre-tax income can be observed without knowing how taxes affected
that income. Oddly, however, Professor Popkin finds general equilibrium analysis to be helpful
in three cases. See id.at 68-69. The function envisioned for general equilibrium analysis in each
of these cases is diametrically opposed to a preference for the pre-tax world as a benchmark.
First, Professor Popkin states that general equilibrium analysis is useful in identifying
situations where tax reform is "a waste of time" because it does not change the distribution
of after-tax income. This suggests that two tax systems that produce the same after-tax result
should be considered normatively equivalent. But the two systems may result in different pretax worlds and thus different relationships between pre-tax and after-tax income.
Second, Professor Popkin argues that general equilibrium analysis is useful in determining
whether one group should receive benefits to compensate for the tax benefits received by another
group. He uses the example of renters versus homeowners. The fact that owners are not taxed
on the implicit rental value of their homes prompts us to consider a compensating benefit for
renters. Suppose, however, that the favorable treatment of oil and gas investments has as much
general equilibrium impact on housing rents as the exclusion of the implicit rental value of
owner-occupied housing. Why should the treatment of oil and gas investments be excluded
from the analysis? Indeed, why should any of the impacts of the tax system, whether or not
they originate from unjustified tax breaks, be excluded? If none are excluded, the benchmark
should be the no-tax world.
Finally, Professor Popkin believes that general equilibrium analysis is useful in determining
whether tax reform causes sudden wealth losses that should be mitigated by transitional relief.
But this is in the same spirit as the belief that we should look back to the no-tax world. The
tax world is simply the no-tax world plus the "tax reform" of imposing the entire tax system.
57. See id.at 69.
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causes people to have more leisure and this whets their appetite for basketball.
As a result, Mr. Magic Bird, a professional basketball player, earns $1,100,000
per year pre-tax in the tax world versus $100,000 per year in the no-tax
world.5 The choice between the pre-tax world and no-tax world as a benchmark determines how the extra $1,000,000 will be taxed. Suppose that the

appropriate tax rate is 50%. With the no-tax world as a benchmark, all of
the $1,000,000 should be taxed away in addition to half of the $100,000 that

Mr. Bird earned in the no-tax world. With the pre-tax world as the benchmark,
the extra $1,000,000 should be taxed in the same way as the original $100,000

that Mr. Bird earned in the no-tax world. Thus, he should pay $550,000 in
tax, that is, one half of each dollar earned in the pre-tax world.
Neither benchmark calls for ignoring the $1,000,000 increase in wages that
Mr. Bird experiences as a result of general equilibrium effects, but they call
for different treatments of that amount. To determine which treatment is
correct requires additional normative analysis. For example, according to
the classical tax-base analysis sketched above, the pre-tax world benchmark
would be wrong because Mr. Magic Bird ends up "sacrificing" a negative
58. For simplicity, assume that Mr. Bird's love of basketball means that he works the same
number of hours and with the same intensity in both worlds. The increase in his pay arises
simply from a wage increase due to heightened demand for high-quality basketball.
This assumption makes this example different from the one presented by Professor Popkin.
In his example, a worker increases the number of hours worked in response to a wage tax. As
a result, the worker's total pre-tax wage earnings in the tax world are higher than the worker's
total wage earnings in the no-tax world. At the same time, the worker has less leisure in the
tax world. This is "stage 1" of the general equilibrium effects in Professor Popkin's example.
A second stage of effects causes other changes in pre-tax earnings. See id. at 69-70.
Professor Popkin discusses the stage 1 effects in terms of "respecting the individual's work/
leisure decision." Id. at 70. Thus, he suggests, a no-tax world benchmark might be adjusted
to be equivalent to stage 1.
His example raises.the whole set of issues that arise from the conventional exclusion of
leisure from the Haig-Simons base. If that base is meant to measure economic well-being, it
should include leisure since leisure is a component of well-being. The exclusion of leisure may
have serious consequences for the degree of information obtainable through the base. For
example, one well-known theoretical article shows that without leisure in the tax base, a regressive
income tax structure may be optimal even if the goal is Rawlsian, namely, to make the least
well-off person as well-off as possible after taxes. This is true even if all incentive effects of
taxation are ignored and if regressivity means that average (in addition to marginal) tax rates
decline with income. See Sadka, On Progressive Income Taxation, 66 Am. EcON. REv. 931
(1976). To be useful in measuring the impact of taxes on distribution, a tax base should suggest
higher average taxes for higher "income" taxpayers under the base.
Including leisure and such consumption items as job pleasure in the tax base entails obvious
practical difficulties. In addition, taking that approach to its limits means that the Haig-Simons
ideal calls for an ability tax: Tax each person on what they could earn if they behaved in a
way that maximized their lifetime earnings. Any departure from that behavior is consumption
in the form of leisure or job enjoyment. This point and its implications for other values such
as liberty have been discussed previously in the legal literature. See Kelman, supra note 48, at
841-42, 880; Klein, Timing in Personal Taxation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 468-69 (1977).
It is unclear what Professor Popkin means by "respecting the individual's work/leisure
decision." It could mean including leisure in the tax base so that it is not an untaxed consumption
good. Most other goods can only be purchased using after-tax dollars. In any event, the example
in the text excludes the complicating considerations that arise from omitting leisure from the
tax base.
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amount in exchange for the benefits of government services. His after-tax
income in the tax world of $550,000 is greater than his $100,000 income in
the no-tax world. The fact that Mr. Magic Bird's wages increase by $1,000,000
from the no-tax world to the pre-tax world calls for taxation of all of that
increase in addition to an exaction from the level of no-tax world wages.
Professor Popkin does not present a similar normative justification for
choosing the pre-tax world as a benchmark, but he mentions two elements
that together may provide such a justification. First, "political relationships"
may dictate our choice of tax policy norms.5 9 Second, no one is very certain
of what a no-tax world would really look like.60 This includes voters.
The "political relationships" argument for classical tax base theory is that
voters look at what they get from government as a whole against what they
pay. They compare the no-tax world to the world with taxes and government
expenditures. Politically viable tax systems thus have to make the right
adjustments from the no-tax world. If one supposes, however, that voters
have no idea what the no-tax world would be like, then politically acceptable
fairness conceptions might be based on pre-tax results in a tax world.
Both political relationship arguments are unrealistic. The public tax policy
debate does include matters of tax incidence that clearly involve the effect
of taxes on pre-tax prices and on behavior. 6' People do not entirely take

59. See Popkin, supra note 4, at 72.
60. See id. at 71-72. There also may be considerable uncertainty as to what the tax world
would look like after a comprehensive change in the tax laws. One of the most important goals
of applied general equilibrium analysis is to estimate the effect of large changes in the tax system.
See C. BALLARD, D. FULLERTON, J. SHOVEN & J. WHALLEY, A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL
FOR TAX POLICY EVALUATION 1 (1985). Professor Popkin, himself, discusses three cases where
general equilibrium analysis would be useful. See supra note 56. Arguing for usefulness in these
cases, however, undermines his claim that the pre-tax world should be the benchmark. See id.
He attempts to get around this problem by claiming that all three cases "utilize information
about pre-tax income in a tax world . . . rather than information about a no-tax world." See
Popkin, supra note 4, at 69. This is a fragile and, in my opinion, untenable distinction. The
problem is that the "information ... in a tax world" is information about a hypothetical tax
world. This world may be as far removed from the present as the no-tax world.
Consider the third case discussed by Professor Popkin. In this case he urges that general
equilibrium analysis be used to assess the transitional losses that would arise from tax reform.
Assessing those losses in advance involves comparing the time path of wealth under the current
tax system to the time path under a tax system that includes reform. At least one of these
time paths will never occur. If the tax reform involved is substantial (e.g., shifting to a CFIT
or a "pure" traditional income tax from the current hybrid between them), the ensuing world
may be as hypothetical as a world without taxes.
61. These include, for example, various "supply side" issues. Will repealing the investment
credit or slowing down depreciation allowances hurt workers in "rust bowl" industries? Will
the curtailment of real estate tax shelters drive up apartment rents? Will lower capital gains
taxes for corporate stock increase venture capital? Will the extra income earned by high-bracket
taxpayers after their rates are cut "trickle down" to others after being spent or invested? If
so, how much? These issues are not just the province of academicians. They are in the nation's
newspapers. Politicians talk about them. This can be verified by reading the "Press Watch"
section and news items in almost any weekly edition of TAX NoTmS magazine.
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the pre-tax world as given. At the same time, Professor Popkin's statements

about the no-tax world seem true. Estimating what the no-tax world would
be like would be a challenging task for an economist. 62 It is hard to imagine
that a clear picture of that world is in the forefront of public political
63
consciousness.

I have already mentioned that using social utility analysis instead of
studying the "distribution of losses" undermines any special normative position for the no-tax world. It also undermines any special normative position
for the pre-tax world. Social utility analysis, however, may provide instrumental arguments for a tax base theory that uses a pre-tax world benchmark.
The Haig-Simons ideal and other tax base concepts may serve as "intermediate rules" rather than as governing norms. Tax base concepts operating
on pre-tax income allow the design of a coherent tax system of specific rules
that follow from those concepts. 4 This permits delegation of rulemaking to
government bureaucrats and courts with a minimum of political oversight.
It also provides a check on political manipulation of the tax laws. Amendments that contravene the tax base concept can be challenged as "loopholes"
or "tax expenditures."

6

The overall effects of this structure would be ana-

lyzed by norms that do not refer to the tax base ideals-for example, by
social utility analysis.
This analysis raises many questions. Do tax base concepts really constrain
political debate? Do they provide effective guidance for judicial and bureaucratic decisionmakers? What if politicians and administrative decisionmakers know that the tax base ideals are not the "real" governing norms
but merely an instrumentality to generate and constrain tax law? 66 Does the
degree of constraint and guidance provided justify ignoring the "real" norms

62. At a minimum, all the difficulties of general equilibrium calculations are involved. See
Strnad, supra note 1, at 1106.
63. Professor Popkin suggests that people might speculate "about what a no-tax world
would look like after repeal of taxes, not what the no-tax world once looked like in some
golden age" before there was any knowledge of taxes. See Popkin, supra note 4, at 71-72.
Perhaps this provides the basis for a political fairness calculation similar to that inherent in
classical tax base theory. It may also be the case that the "no-tax world" that economists
might construct would correspond to what the world would look like after the repeal of current
taxes rather than to the "real" no-tax world. This is because the estimates of behavior that
economists use are taken from the world with taxes. Behaioral parameters in general equilibrium
models, however, can be manipulated to suit the imagination.
64. See Strnad, supra note 1, at 1032 (some see the Haig-Simons doctrine as central to
constructing a coherent income tax).
65. The "loopholes" or "tax expenditures" would have to be justified by reference to social
utility analysis, by reference to some other non-tax-base norm, or as a necessary concession in
some political bargain.
66. Then the term "tax expenditure" carries no special stigma. It merely implies an analysis
similar to other expenditures. Professor Popkin laments that this type of thinking seems to be
"an emerging trend" in opposition to "the familiar view that tax fairness creates a presumption
against using the tax law for expenditure purposes." Popkin, supra note 4, at 72.
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in favor of the instrumental ones? Without answers to some of these questions, this type of theory remains pure speculation.
CONCLUSION

In discussing benchmarks to gauge the "distribution of losses," Professor
Popkin states that "[t]he normative value of the no-tax world must be
justified, not assumed. '67 This is certainly true. He provides some cogent
reasons for rejecting the no-tax world as a benchmark. But the justifications
for choosing his competing candidate, the pre-tax world, are equally weak,
if not weaker, than those for the no-tax world. In any event, neither benchmark stands on very firm normative ground.
If the pre-tax world were the desirable benchmark, two of the conclusions
in my original article would be changed. First, the claim in that article for
the usefulness of general equilibrium analysis would be false. The pre-tax
world can be observed without knowing how it has been formed by the
general equilibrium effects of taxes. Second, the result that the CFIT implements the Haig-Simons ideal could be taken to be the new conventional
wisdom. The argument that this result is merely an interesting anomaly
because it is derived in a non-general-equilibrium setting would no longer
be viable.
Other points are not affected by the choice of benchmark. Traditional
income tax treatments, including the SIT proposed by Professor Popkin, do
not implement the Haig-Simons ideal. This is true regardless of the choice
of benchmark. Finally, the choice between social utility analysis and studying
the distribution of losses has very little impact on the points made in my
original article.
67. Id. at 68.

